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THE

AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.
APRIL, 1880.
1

MATERIALS OF JURISPRUDENCE.
THIs period is marked by rather more strenuous efforts than have

been made before in this country, to solve the problem of condensing and simplifying the law. Our own day is peculiar in the
endeavors we have seen to evolve what is claimed to be a science
of jurisprudence. Some admirable writers have succeeded in
dividing the domain of law into its larger or smaller fields, and
have shown with more or less fulness the relative positions of
these, and their mutual dependence. This is a valuable service;
for all lawyers know that, without a reasonably clear perception
of the place of every rule in the general scheme of law, there can
be no complete understanding of any legal doctrine.
But all of these attempts to resolve law into a science have
shown, and the best writers appreciate it, that this science stops
short at arrangement and classification, and furnishes no definite
rules of conduct. The law of the land must always continue to
be the expressed or implied will of the State, varying from time
to time, like the will of individuals, and subject- though in a
less degree - to irrational and wilful impulses. No wise man
imagines that the time will ever come when one and the same
"State's collected will" can prevail in all countries, unless on
subjects belonging to international law, or at least connected with
extended commerce. If such nominal unifornity should be agreed
upon, or imposed on many countries, it could not last in fact,
whatever it might do in name. The rules would receive such
different constructions, that the elasticity of language would become marvellous.
While it is not at all likely that such relief as we may some
day obtain against the indigestibility of our monstrous bulk of
VOL. .-
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law material will come in the shape of any philosophical panacea,
we may expect it in some form. The healing forces of nature
are not more c~rtain than those of society. Whatever difficulties
may spring from positive enactments or customs, which have no
moral quality or value beyond any others that might have existed in their stead, the great bulk of law rests on moral rules
which can never be changed, and which suggest means of enforcement of their own which will not bear indefinite restriction.
As soon as the existing machinery of the law fails to secure substantial justice, the correcting process begins, unless the abuse is
so great as to demand an entire reconstruction; and this will
come in due time, although with more trouble.
Thus far the evils of the legal systems with Which we have
more directly to do have not come from the insufficiency of the
body of the law. Some changes have been made in our land
laws, whereby we have got rid of a moderate portion of anachronisms, usually credited in some vague way to the feudal system, but savoring more of crude metaphysics than of any system
whatever. These changes have required legislation, and will
require more. But in commercial and business affairs the statutory changes have seldom done more than sanction what had
already become customary. A few great inventions, such as railroads and telegraphs, were originally brought into use under laws
specially devised for their regulation. But these have only served
as new illustrations of the unfailing truth that no wisdom can
devise laws for untried enterprises that experience will not find
it necessary to alter. The results obtained from steam and electricity have already gone infinitely beyond the largest possibilities
imagined by those who first succeeded in using those powerful
agents. The reserved forces of the common law have been. found
more adequate to correct the blunders of legislatioti than successive statutes have been.
There is an apparent exception in regard to crimes,' but it is
only apparent. The great changes made in the interests of
humanity have not been so much in the list of offences as in their
punishment, and in their classification for the purpose of apportioning punishment more fairly. Very few new crimes have been
defined. And even when new ones have been added to the list, they
are probably, without exception, acts which were legally wrong,.
and subject to civil remedies already. Where this is the case,
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declaring them to be crimes is only another way of declaring
that the old remedies were inadequate,- just as new cases are
continually calling for equitable interference for similar reasons.
Under our system it is wisely provided that no court can determine without legislative sanction that any act not before punishable shall be treated as criminal. It is only because there is no
such rule in regard to equity that statutes are not required to
bring new complications, when common-law remedies fail, within
the scope of equitable jurisdiction. In both classes the change
is only remedial.
All schemes of law reform which propose to introduce substantial changes in rights as well as remedies are presumptively
unwise, - not because laws now existing are perfect, but because
changes not imperatively demanded by public necessity can be
made more perfectly and prudently when the occasion arises, and
suggests- as it usually will - the extent of the mischief to be corrected. The existing difficulties which have exercised so many
active minds are not found in the rules of law so much as in the
means of determining what those rules are. They are but slightly
connected with the systems of remedies by which the laws are enforced. These have already become reasonably simplified. The
law itself is getting buried in rubbish.
It certainly seems strange, to one not learned in the law, 'to
have a simple question concerning the legal right or wrong of a
given course answered by referring to a mass of decisions made
in various States, and very possibly in various ways. On other
subjects there seems to be a more summary way of disposing ot
such questions. A theologian may refer to many books to settle
some question of ecclesiastical dogma, but seldom for questions
The conduct of men must be determined by
of conscience.
simpler methods. And inasmuch as in business affairs most problems cannot wait for a professional solution, cases ought not to be
numerous in which legal principles need be ascertained through
any difficult process. The order of society could not long be
maintained without the assurance that men may usually be held
responsible for a knowledge of the law. Whatever may be the
fact, they cannot generally be allowed to take refuge in their
ignorance from the consequences of its violation. And we find
that most men have enough actual knowledge to save them from
becoming law breakers. They do not, in one case out of a thou-
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sand, learn the law from a search into authorities, which is supposed to be the lawyer's method of informing himself. If they
were to look into the reports for themselves, they would be hopelessly muddled. If they constantly employed others to do it for
them, the affairs of life would come to a standstill.
Lawyers themselves are discovering that there is something
wrong in this waste of time and confounding of ideas. When
it has been determined by a competent tribunal that black is
black, and white is white, neither blackness nor whiteness is
made any plainer by the multiplication of opinions to the same
effect. There should at least be a point where the reiteration
may stop. As a matter of fact, we all know that among lawyers
who have more than one case at'a time, this point is reached
early. But there is a certain supposed occasion for the display
of erudition, which leads men who are otherwise candid into
garnishing their briefs and treatises with long lists of names
taken on trust at second hand, or gathered from the Digests,
which represent cases that cannot possibly have been carefully
read, if read atall. There may be writers who examine all the cases
they cite, and yet cite a great many. They are not like other men
if they do this. thoroughly. There are very good books with many
citations which were never gathered by their authors in person at
all, and Which bear witness to this by repeating misquotations
and verbal errors that sometimes have marred generations of predecessors. When we attempt to verify these citations, they are
sometimes traced through books and authorities that we know
are reliable in themselves, and we accept the doctrine for the
borrower's sake, with no further search for the lender.
The time will probably never come when precedents will be
useless. But the time has come and gone many times when it
became necessary to give up the old and resort to the new; and
now that the new are multiplying so rapidly, some other process
of choice and rejection is unavoidable. It behooves us, therefore, to consider what is the real office and value of precedents.
It is above all important to know whether they are to be looked
upon as the origin, or only as the testimony of legal doctrines,
and how far their witness goes. One would think there could be
no doubt about their place in our system, but they are sometimes
strangely used.
There are two great divisions of lawyers, - those who cite
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cases chiefly because of circumstantial resemblances, and those
who use them as recognitions of doctrine. The thorough-bred
case lawyer is often successful within a certain range of business,
where substantially exact pqrallels are easily found, - although
even there a little variation iufacts may mean a great deal. But
on questions of constitutional or statutory construction, or even
in the interpretation of peculiar private documents, he is apt to
be at fault. He would be so much oftener if every man were
not forced to use his common-sense in all kinds of work, and
make his practice better than his theory. It is astounding to hear
the preposterous arguments that men of no mean powers sometimes feel warranted in using on the faith of misapplied precedents. The very multitude of reported cases has had one good
effect in making the old-fashioned case lawyer nearly impossible.
It has led to excessive citations, and thus produced confusion;
but no court will listen to the indefinitely prolonged reading of
authorities. However indulgent the bench may be to such repetitions, there must be required at some time a statement of the
principle claimed to result from the aggregate, and a reference
without reading to the greater portion.
One prolific source of mischief we are rapidly getting rid of.
On technicalities of pleading and practice, precedents had no
value except as precedents, and became very troublesome. What
we did not learn from reason has been taught us by necessity.
There are few States or courts which have not discovered that
whatever tends to delay issues and trials is mischievous to justice.
The modern codes of procedure were devised to get rid of the
pettifogging and confusion that came from the perversion of the
system of special pleading, and the multiplied rules of practice
that were its parasites.. No system of practice can be of more
intrinsic importance than another. That system is best which
reaches a just end soonest and most easily. It was never difficult
for a good lawyer to draw up a sufficient common-law declaration, which should be as simple and concise as any well-framed
complaint under a code. A bill in equity was never demurrable
for substance if it contained a plain and complete narrative of
facts, showing an equitable cause of action, and indicating the
relief desired. It was only the absurd multiplication of pleadings, repeating in several counts or pleas the same thing contained in others, with slight variations, which gave no actual
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information to anybody, and the necessity created or supposed-to
be created of putting in a separate plea or set of pleas for each
ground of defence, that made the old system deservedly odious.
A controversy where all the facts on both sides could have been
intelligibly stated in a page or two, was narrated, or, to speak
more correctly, disguised, in a series of counts and pleas and
replications, with possible rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, rebutters,
and sur-rebutters, that were absolutely unintelligible to ordinary
men, and often to everybody. It was only the blind love of precedent that made the wordy draftsman stop at sur-rebutters.
There was surely no reason in the nature of those acrobatic
dialectics which made it impossible to continue the series indefinitely. The sacred seven pleadings might as well have been twice
or even seventy times seven, if the tired imagination of their first
inventor could have devised any names for them. Fortunately,
a plea without a name was a. thing at which legal reason revolted. When a respectable body of learned and acute men
stand aside from the trial of causes andhandling actual facts,
and devote themselves exclusively to framing pleadings, they
very soon come to regard the pleadings as the chief end of controversy, and look on the determination of the merits as entirely
subordinate. Their example, and the intricacies in which they
involve the case, lead to a similar magnifying of rules of practice.
Judges who have been trained to believe in the vast importance
of subtleties and technicalities will sacrifice substantial 'rights to
useless forms.
The great argument in favor of special pleading, which is still
pathetically urged by admirers of the old system, is that it brings
out every issue clearly, and also serves to train the lawyer to
exactness and logical accuracy. That it did train men in habits
of close discrimination is true. But even this merit is exaggerated. There are minds already over-subtle that need to be
restrained from over-refining; and persons having such a tendency multiply distinctions beyond sense and reason, and make
it impossible to apply the rules of law, as they define them, to
the actual business of life. Some of the best legal intellects, and
some of the safest judges and counsellors, cannot pursue these
niceties very far without hopeless bewilderment. And we all
know that when a sensible and slow man allows himself, as
he sometimes will, to indulge in metaphysical refinements, his
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vagaries are surprising. Those of us who remember special pleading experiences can recall instances where acute counsel have
amused themselves with trying how far they could prolong the
floundering of an unhappy brother of heavier capacity, by demurrers and immaterial issues, until months and even years have
passed before the case reached the jury. When that came, it not
seldom happened that their ponderous antagonist would have his
turn in a more public triumph, and fairly annihilate them. As
for bringing out the issues more clearly, it must be remembered
that those who have most need of knowing their precise effect
are the jurors. If any thing could hopelessly befog a jury, intelligent or stupid, it would be listening to the reading of such
pleadings.
Probably few counsel have ever been foolish enough
to attempt such a farce. When they have done so, their success,
it may fairly be presumed, did not encourage its repetition.
The same practice which prevailed in common-law cases was
found in a modified form in equity. The use of a general repli'cation prevented any long succession of pleadings, and made the
bill and answer include all the issues. The nature of an English
bill - especially where it had to be verified - made it necessary
to have in some part of it a tolerably direct story of the facts.
But the pleader's imagination was allowed to run riot in the
superfluous parts, which were retained, for not very creditable
reasons, long after their uselessness was acknowledged. In the
combination and charging parts, and in the interrogating part,there
was room for great expansion. The most punctiliously correct
and honest man, who happened to be interested, however remotely,
in something which was to be affected by the suit, was sure to
find himself charged with maliciously, wrongfully, and with all
the other known adverbs of wickedness, combining and confederating with his co-defendants and unknown conspirators to
defraud and injure the unfortunate complainant. He was then
charged with falsely and fraudulently getting up all manner of
false pretexts and sham defences, and an imaginative draftsman
would set out a fearful list of such iniquities. If the defendant
happened to be a matter-of-fact man, with a reasonable regard
for his good name and fame, it was not always easy to satisfy him
that, although charged with a good share of the worst crimes in
the decalogue, he ought not to take offence at it.
Although the answer had to be sworn to, yet there was always
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room in that pleading to insert a great deal of matter not held to
be covered by the oath; and if the defendant's counsel desired to
cover the case with as much fog as possible, there were ample
opportunities for such abuses. The real use of all these prolixities, both at law and in equity, was that they furnished a living to men who made profit by multiplying words. The reports
were lumbered up with pleading and practice cases, which were
all the more eagerly sought as precedents because they involved
no principle whatever, and, must be blindly followed, if followed
at all.
When the abuse became beyond endurance, a remedy was
sought in two different ways, but with the same purpose. One
project was the entire rejection of the old system, and the substitution of what is called a code in its place. The other was the
reduction of the existing practice to simplicity. The code system
was adopted with the design of having all the facts set out in a
natural way by plaintiff and defendant, so as to develop the
issue as it would appear on the trial. The common-law reformers
introduced liberal statutes of amendments and jeofails, to prevent
parties from being injured by mispleading, and allowed all defences to be brought in under a notice appended to the plea of
the general issue. Both of these projects met with hostility
among the bigoted votaries of the old system. The code was
condemned as not favorable to logical and formal neatness. The
notice was complained of as allowing issues to be tried which
were not plainly formulated.
, There were some courts as bitterly hostile to simplification as
any of the bar; and where such hostility existed, the old abuses
were magnified rather than diminished, because most practice
questions had been settled before, and the changes in legislation
furnished an excuse-only too eagerly seized-to unsettle
every thing. The special pleaders, where they found a favorable
hearing from the bench, succeeded in nullifying the benefits of
notices, by having them required to be drawn with all the precision of special pleas, instead of with merely reasonable certainty. This perpetuated most of the mischiefs of the old
practice. In States where this narrow policy prevailed, a more
radical remedy was the only one which could do any good.
The introduction of a code, if fairly treated, could have afforded
this remedy, as it has done in part. But it met desperate
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opposition from many very able lawyers and judges, who insisted
on applying to it many of the same technical rules which had
made the old practice odious. Under such treatment nothing
was gained in expedition, and very little in simplicity. So many
practice questions had to be settled or re-settled, that the reported
practice cases form an enormous mass, too closely comparing
with the decisions on merits. In those regions where a code
was adopted at the beginning of their judicial career, this difficulty has been much less, and has not always been serious.
There is no good reason why it should not in such places be
made simple and useful. Whether it works better there than
an improved law and equity system cannot probably be determined. Either system in good hands will work smoothly and
expeditiously. There can be nothing gained in giving up one
for another, when it works well and has become familiar. It
can only add to the multitude of useless, if not frivolous, litigation, and swell the ranks of valueless law-books.
The distinction between cases calling for a single hearing, and
a judgment for damages or possession, and those which require
successive inquiries and flexible specific remedies, is one which
must always exist, and which no system of procedure can
change. Whatever names may be given to these two classes
of controversies, they iill always represent what are known,
under the old definitions, as Actions at Law and Suits in Equity.
There are very few, if any, places where equitable rights are
not held valid and respected in all courts; and where there is
any common-law remedy suitable for their enforcement, they can
generally be made available in such an action. In those States
which retain the distinctions of law and equity, the difference
is generally one of remedies, and legal and equitable suits differ
only as actions of assumpsit differ from ejectment or replevin.
It is true that in the courts of the United States government it
is held that the Constitution perpetuates the old disability against
enforcing equitable rights in common-law actions, or seeking
common-law rights through equity. Yet even there assignees
obtain redress at common law, directly or indirectly, and under
*the patent and copyright laws penalties may be enforced in
equity. These are innovations on the ancient law, and the
latter is a very serious innovation on the most liberal modern
practice, inasmuch as it cuts off trial by jury on charges which
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are penal. It is one of the difficulties of a code system that the
constitutional right of trial by jury, which is universally preserved in all the States, can only be secured by keeping in mind
the old distinctions. It was never reckoned to be a right except
in common-law cases; but in those it is a right on which men
are justly tenacious, and it becomes necessary on this account to
know what cases under the code belong to that class.
The objection chiefly urged against the substitution of a notice
under the general issue for special pleas is that the parties are
not informed by the record of the precise case they have to meet.
This objection, however, applies nearly as well to the older
system where pleas and counts were multiplied, and where the
common counts did general service. A special plea was always
demurrable if it covered defences which could be made under
the general issue, and the scope of that was very wide. It is
unquestionable, too, that, after the practice allowed any number
of special pleas to be put in, the pleader very generally put them
in without much reference to the exact facts, and so multiplied and
varied them as to obscure the issues, rather than present them
clearly. This, however, does not entirely answer the objection,
because, if sound, the reform should have met it. But the real
answer is that the method does not work badly in practice, and
it is never desirable to change methods of procedure without a
prospect of doing some good by it. Under these rather slipshod
proceedings it is found that parties are seldom surprised at the
trial, and are never more likely to be so than under the other
methods. It must not be forgotten that, when special pleading
was in its prime, there was less liberality in regard to amendments; and filing a wrong plea, or committing any sin against
pleader's logic, was often fatal. The capital merit of bringing
the cause to an issue in a very few weeks at latest outweighs
almost any theoretical advantage which prolongs the litigation
without any adequate recompense for the delay.
Mr. Butler, in his "Reminiscences," refers to an early attempt
to substitute notices for pleadings, and to the divided opinions of
the English bar on the subject. After mentioning. that the
civilians of antiquity branched into two sects,- the Proculeians'
adhering strictly to letter and form, and the Sabinians, or Cassians, recommending liberality of practice and construction,
he proceeds: -
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" Something like this difference has long subsisted at the English bar; but
the good sense of English lawyers has prevented them from forming
themselves into sects. About the year 1770, a bill was brought into the
House of Commons for allowing defendants, in almost all cases, to plead

the general issue, and give the special matter in evidence. The measure
failed; its effect would have been to confine special pleading within very
narrow limits. It is not a little remarkable that it was favored by Mr.
Wallace, who was a mere special pleader, and opposed by Mr. Dunning,
who, like the Reminiscent's friend, Mr. Tidd, was both a special pleader
and much more." 1

It is true that in America, as in England, good lawyers and
sensible men have been opposed on all these matters, and that
all changes which are supposed to mar the symmetry of the old
close system of pleading have been regarded by some useful
judges and counsel as dangexous.
But it is questionable
whether there may not have been unconsciously lurking in their
minds a feeling that such innovations would make their "cunning of fence " unavailable, as villainous saltpetre renders the
expert swordsman no match for a fair marksman with his gun.
The changes in the law of evidence which have removed the
disabilities of parties and interested or convicted parties as witnesses, and the statutory provisions for preserving testimony by
depositions, to be used when witnesses could not be examined at
the hearing, have not only relieved the books of much bulky
discussion, but have put an end to most of the auxiliary jurisdiction of equity to furnish testimony for use at law. The
practical effect of all this has been to simplify and reduce the
equitable jurisdiction to the enforcement of peculiar or specific
remedies, instead of being in any sense an opposing system to
the common law.
Under the old practice, the equity draftsman rivalled the
special pleader in prolixity, and more than rivalled him in verbose repetitions. The English bill, which began as a simple and
informal petition in plain English, expanded under this treatment
into a very absurd composition; and the answer was drawn
with equal verbosity to cover up the ingenious, but not ingenuous, efforts of counsel to enable their clients to evade replies to
all awkward interrogatories.
When courts desiring reform were baffled in their efforts to
1

Reminiscences, ch. ix.
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simplify and shorten proceedings, by the perverse obstinacy or
selfish cunning of those who were as set against innovation as
their congeners, the Ephesian smiths, who monopolized the
making of silver shrines for a very homely idol, the end was
reached in one State, at least, by a simple remedy. The old 'feebill was abolished. Costs were taxed without reference to the
pleadings. When folios ceased to figure on taxation, and the
pleader got no more for a ream of pleadings and a score of interlocutory applications than for a single page and a single hearing,
economy of time and words became profitable. Now and then
a chivalrous champion of the old school multiplies his counts and
expands his averments. But men, in general, however prodigal
of breath, do not care to work for nothing.
No one who has not had some experience of these changes, or
examined into the intricacies and peculiarities which we have
discarded, can estimate what an immense body of rules and
precedents became obsolete.
A faint idea can be formed by
comparing the practice cases with the rest of the reports, and
considering that in many States practice cases are almost unknown in courts of last resort. The lawyer who now is frightened by the accumulation of authorities has the consolation of
knowing that most of his researches are made among things
of intrinsic importance.
In this the advantage is twofold. It is
neither pleasant nor profitable to spend time and labor on trifles.
And it is more difficult to master arbitrary rules and customs,
than those principles which have not only governed human
conduct in the past, but must direct it in all time to come.
But notwithstanding this great relief, by the removal of so
much of the lawyer's work, from the necessity of seeking out
what was hardly worth seeking, we find the amount of books
of various kinds, to which he is invited to give his attention,
so great as to be almost disheartening. The question is continually presented, What can be done to secure sound law with
the least waste of time and toil?
In law, as well as in other things, it will usually be found that
evils, sooner or later, work their own cure. The superfluity of
law-books is only a similar mischief to other redundancies which
affect the whole people. There is no place and no occupation
that is not annoyed by them. There was a time when few men
of culture could be found who did not know something about
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every book that obtained much currency. There were many
crude and trashy works, and many dull and respectable, with
probably about the same proportion as now of positively good
ones.' A certain deference was paid to almost any decent author,
and a corresponding deference was paid by the author to the
right of the reading public to his best efforts. Now authorship
is not in itself more respected or respectable than other honest
callings, and books when published, unless under influential
sponsors, must jostle or wait for place like other commodities.
Readers of all classes fail to see some things they would have
enjoyed, and perhaps have found very useful; while two out of
three confine themselves to a few books, and read a great deal of
lighter material, which, whether instructive or not, has the
advantage of being compact. The habits which are forced on us
by daily papers and the telegraph lead us into rapid and cursory
views of a great many things. Condensation has become a
cardinal virtue, and mere brevity is often mistaken for it. This
is found in law as well as elsewhere. But it is not so safe to
mix up all manner of adulterations with genuine law, as to
mingle oth~r things that are less important.
Whatever may be the suggestive value of alien law, it i0not
our law; and courts, when they allow their judgments to be
warped by it, - even when they thoroughly understand it, which
must be a very uncommon experience, - are not only legislating
instead of expounding the law, but are judging people by a
standard of which they are ignorant, and 'which they are not
bound to regard. Not a little mischief has been done by this
unwise and dangerous indulgence. While there is a great difference in degree between adopting foreign law and following the
lead of kindred jurisdictions, there is a similar danger in resorting to indiscriminate citations of outside authorities. Doubtless,
we may safely assume that there is no part of the Union, and
no common-law region, where bench and bar cannot throw
light on questions of general concern. But every State and
nation has some peculiar rules, customary or statutory, touching
legal rights and interests, which may give a tinge to the whole
body of its jurisprudence. The opinions of any respectable court
have a decided value to all who study them. But it is not true,
in' any sense, that they are of positive authority anywhere else.
If precedents were scarce, they might be more necessary. But
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every lawyer must admit that, except to those courts that are
subject to its review, or administer the same laws, no decision of
any tribunal has real value beyond the weight of its reasoning,
or the respect due to the opinion of judges who have proved their
claim to deference. We all habitually look to the common law as
the origin of our system, and we know that all courts dealing with
common-law principles are likely to make similar rulings on
similar familiar conditions. But we are constantly meeting With
new conditions, some of which affect all parts of the country
alike, while more of them are affected by local customs and
Lazy legislators and ignorant theoretical recircumstances.
formers borrow untried statutes or detached fragments of statutory schemes, when the sections or chapters borrowed cannot
mean the same thing under different surroundings; and then the
court which first construes phrases or sections is held by rash
text-writers to have settled the law, unless some other court very
speedily differs from it. This can only be when a similar controversy has arisen elsewhere, and we all know that such controversies may lie dormant a great while. A few more decisions,
though based solely on the first one, make up that*mysterious
bugbear which is solemnly called the weight of authority; and
the unlucky citizen is gravely told he must be held responsible
for a knowledge of law which has never been promulgated in his
own State, and of which he never beard as announced anywhere.
And so he is cast in damages or stripped of his possessions in
obedience to authority to which he was never subject, and under
rules which may have neither wisdom nor justice to sustain
them.
Whatever may be professed on this subject, it is certain, as a
matter of fact, that, in a majority of cases, these outside decisions
are not followed for their cogent and convincing reasoning, but
because they are recorded in books of reports. Men follow them
as sheep follow their leader, over fences and ditches as well as
on the highway. And it is chiefly because the numerous decisions, that are rightly no more than local precedents, are cited
indiscriminately as the law of the land, that the complaints of the
growing bulk of law literature have become so loud and importunate. The well-meant attempts to condense them by selection
is a temporary relief, but a very imperfect one. Such collections
can rarely show the mutual bearings of decisions which sometimes
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must be taken together in order to be comprehended at all. Digests
of such a multitude of cases are imperfect, because, however well
arranged, they cannot throw light on the implications behind
local decisions. The only practical refuge is among the textwriters; and it is hardly to be doubted that, while nominally
based on original references, a great deal of op*r law is borrowed
from their books, and borrowed with reasonable safety. Those
which are reliable at all come near enough to the fountains of
the law for many purposes, and they always furnish a good starting-point for further investigations. There are text-books written by some of the old lawyers which have the fullest authority,
and there are modern text-books which deserve it.
Lord Mansfield, who certainly managed to extract the kernel
of jurisprudence, whatever he may have done with the husk, is
said to have remarked, when speaking of the great increase in
the number of law-books, "that it did not increase the amount
of necessary reading, as the new publications frequently rendered
unnecessary the reading of the old. Thus," he said, "after Mr.
Justice Blackstone had published his Commentaries, no one
thought of reading Wood's Institutes or Finch's Law, which,
till then, were the first books usually put into the hands of
students." He said that, when he was young, few persons would
confess that they had not read a considerable part, at least, of the
Year-books; but that, at the time in which he was speaking, few
would pretend to more than an occasional recourse to them in
very particular cases.'
No lawyer now is ashamed to say he never read the Year-books;
for, with our changed methods of education, very few could read
them if they tried. Excursions into such fields are more like the
amusement of antiquaries than the solid work of study. Even
the older text-books are used more for occasional reference than
for reading. Yet no work on criminal law has ever surpassed
Lord Hale in clearness or philosophy; and the Reminiscent
before mentioned, who was not only an elegant scholar, but
learned in continental law, and one of the profoundest of common
lawyers, gave strong testimony in favor of the study of Coke's
Commentary on Littleton, and showed his confidence by joining
his own labors to those of Mr. Hargrave in annotating it. Now
and then any court may be called on to decide matters which
I Butler's Rem. ch. xi.
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have not been discussed by modern jurists; and when such
occasions arise, the merits of the old lawyers become apparent.
The few treatises that have escaped oblivion are, in many respects,
as full of life now as ever.

Their garments may be quaint, but

they cover sound bodies.
The greatest English lawyers agree in admiring Littleton, who
has had the singular honor of being accepted as authority for
some purposes in Normandy, as well as in England, upon the
ancient customs. Basnage makes frequent reference to him, as
he does also to that little read but elegant and nervous writer,
Sir Thomas Smith, whose small treatise on the English commonwealth .is one of the best works of its kind in existence. A little
reflection on the reason of this remarkable survival of popularity
may give us a hint concerning what law-books ought to be. It
has been acutely remarked by a shrewd critic that the books
which outlast their own generation, and maintain perennial popularity, are small books. As he quaintly expresses it: "The light
skiff will shoot the cataracts of time, when a heavier vessel will
infallibly go down." 1 Littleton is to most modern writers as the
Institutes are to the Digest, or as the sea laws and French customs' and ordinances are to the commentaries on them. His
propositions contain the law pure and simple. He does not
usually reason them out, or explain them, but he states the rules
very clearly; and they must, when written, have sufficed to ex-.
plain themselves. If the common law of his day had not been
almost absorbed in tenures and estates, he might have written
works which would have been in use to this day as standard textbooks. His method is precisely what we need now, and precisely
what, in most times and countries, has been the surest relief from
that confusion which is caused by the multiplication of crude
materials. His treatise is not one which quite meets the wants
of our time, when land laws have been reformed and commerce
is the great mother of lawsuits. But its accurate brevity is
worthy of emulation.
It is not an easy matter to reduce the law to a series of detached propositions, which will need no expansion or qualification. It is not impossible in matters of positive law, and in most
cases of distinct usages it may be feasible. The old English land
law was very well suited to this treatment. But the more im1 Glory and Shame ofLiterature. Edinburgh Rev. 1839.
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portant and flexible doctrines are much more difficult to formulate,
because general statements are seldom made definite enough, and
concise statements are apt to be partial. If attempted by an
average legislature, the best and neatest propositions would be
amended into confusion. Moreover, what we need is a formulation of such doctrines as are generally accepted through the
United States, which will be authority everywhere, and universally useful. Such a work can be done in one part of the
country as well as another. It needs the best skill of the best
jurists to make it what it should be. Local variations and qualifications could be separately explained without spoiling the symmetry of the rest. More trouble arises from the inherent difficulty
of making complete formulas than from any other cause.
There is a great temptation in the way of lawyers to be sententious. A terse, strong assertion of any kind not only has
weight with the multitude, but even with the m~n who makes
it. For many purposes such utterances are valuable. They
keep in mind the main point in controversy, and prevent its being
lost in the confusion of minor questions. But they are liable to
do harm by this plausible quality; for every one has known bad
cases and sophistical arguments backed up by the sonorous utterance of sound maxims and legal truisms, which are very good
where they belong, but do not belong to the case where they are
used. There is no more instructive reading for those who are
sanguine about the ease of making terse formulas than the treatises
on legal maxims, and the laborious explanations which show
,that for the most part they are no guides at all in doubtful cases.
Legal casuistry does not often reach the absurd advancement
of that described in Pascal's Provincial Letters, but it cannot be
denied that an occasional ambition emulates it. In the main,
legal discussion is fair, and absurd extremes are individual and
not general follies.
Maxims, which belong to the same family with proverbs, and
often become proverbs, are safer for laymen than for 1ihwyers;
because laymen habitually talk less precisely than they think,
and find it safe to take a good deal for granted. But there will
always be some very respectable lawyers who sorely lack imagination, and who accept very literally all that drops from the lips of
legal authority. It is, perhaps, neither our shame nor our misfortune, but rather a source of stability, that the race of common
VOL. I. -

N. S.

18
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lawyers contains its full proportion of rather slow intellects that
feel their way, and work out reasonably well with time and reflection, but do not take in much at a glance. But it must be confessed that we cannot get much help in legal reform from such
men. We cannot overlook them, for they contain the largest
reserve of that terrible force, the vi8 inertice; and unless they
can be moved with the rest, there can be little motion.
Although it is said that in many other countries pithy legal*
proverbs abound, it may be that those who use them find similar
difficulty in applying them without qualification. But it is remarkable how-few such proverbs or pithy rules are found in the
English language, or in common-law authorities in any language.
Most of our current maxims have come down to us in a Latin
dress, and more of them probably came from the civilians than
from English judges. They seem never to have had English
originals, and could have had little, -if any, currency among the
English-people, whose common law was, in the main at least, well
known to the mass of the people. The English forms, where
they have been translated, are not found among the common
fund of popular proverbs. They are often clumsy and incorrect,

and have led to bad mistakes. To be sure, these mistakes are not
confined to the Latin maxims, for one of the few rhyming English saws, although a modern one, led to a very serious contention
,on the right of juries in libel cases, Lord Mansfield maintaining
his view by representing Mr. Pulteney's ballad on the acquittal
aof the publishers of the "Craftsman" as saying :
"For twelve honest men have decided the cause,
Who are judges of fact, but not judges of laws;"

-when the balladist was twitting the Attorney-General for losing
a case where the jury disregarded the charge of the court, and
acted, as he claimed rightly, as those
"Who were judges alike of the facts and the laws." I

But rhymes on legal topics have never gained popular currency,
although Coke's Reports were versified, and Burrow recorded a
settlement .case in doggrel. The lawyers and courts are oftener
misled than the people by the stock maxims. None has been
oftener misapplied than one which certainly should have been
more carefully weighed than any other, - Ignorantiajuris, quod
I

Lives of the Chancellors, vol. vi. p. 176.
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quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat. This, which is not elegantly expressed, is generally paraphrased into a maxim that
every man is presumed, not bound, to know the law, and has
often been applied with that meaning. Yet in larceny, and perhaps in some other cases in criminal law, igiorance of the law,
and reliance on a mistaken notion of legal right, may negative
felonious intent. In Martindale v. Faulkner,' Maule, J., very
neatly and plainly exposes the erroneous version. " There is no
presumption in this country that every person krfows the law ; it
would be contrary to reas'on andcommon sense if it were so."
And Lord Mansfield, in Jones v. Randall,2 in reply to a rhetorical
flourish .of Mr. Dunning on the presumed knowledge of the courts
and jidges, made this pertinent remark: As to the certainty of
the law mentioned by Mr. Dunning, it would be very hard on the
profession. if the law was so certain that everybody,knew it; the
misfortune is, that it is so uncertain that it costs much money to
know what it is, even in the last resort."
These suggestions
have been accepted and acted on repeatedly, and yet the. maxim
is generally misquoted and very often misapplied.
The equity writers who have made many clandestin6, and un.authorized excursions into the fields of the civil law, which common-law judges would not hold an Englishman either presumed
or bound to know, have gathered more. of these maxims from
foreign learning than from home sources. Some of them come
near being sound rul6s of universal law. But if the leading
maxims of equity were placed side by side, as independent and
universal propositions, they would present a curious medley of
contradictions, although safe. enough When qualified and properly
applied. But when we are told in one breath that priority of
equity prevails, and then that equality is equity; that equity
follows the law, yet only gives relief where legal remedies, are
inadequate; that equity treats that as done which ought to be
done; and other propositions of similar obscurity, - we begin to
appreciate Lord Mansfield's remarks.
We need not study maxims long to discover that the way out
of our confusion requires more reliable guides. We find why it
is that precedents are needed. Among the old sages, and among
religious and philosophical teachers of all, ages, the proverb is
supplemented by the parable, or by some illustration from life.
*"

1 2 C.

B. 719.

2 Cowp. 38.
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Our old English authors sometimes preferred to let the precedent
stand alone, so that any one might draw his own inference. But
while many of the early reports and abridgments merely gave
facts and judgments, the contemporaneous authors made little
reference to them, although giving such explanations as served
as good a purpose. And inasmuch as the principle is all that is
valuable in the precedent, it seems better to put principle and
judgment together, like fable and moral, so that there may be no
blunder in draNwing the inference. Our courts, from the prevailing American custom of preparing written opinions, have acquired the habit of expanding the principles involved in the
controversy into legal treatises, sometimes at great length. There
is value in these discussions, where they deal with legal rules
which have not before been fully vindicated. Upon questions of
statutory construction, or constitutional law, they are almost indispensable. But it may be doubted whether the courts might
not act more profitably for' the ba r and for the public by more
abbreviation. Of course the labor would be greater, for words
would have to be carefully weighed, and most of our courts are
already overburdened. The attention of lawyers is always first
turned to a particular decision as bearing on a case by the headnotes or summaries prepared by the reporters, or other writers for
the press ; and while the average skill of these gentlemen is very
creditable, they too are hurried, and will occasionally mistake the
exact meaning and bearing of an opinion which they summarize,
or omit a vital point. Long opinions are more liable to this misrepresentation than short ones, and are more likely to repel
counsel who are driven into an emergency from spending the
time necessary to read them critically. It is a commoner experience than it ought to be for courts to have cases brought up
for. review on points settled long before, which reporters have
failed to note, or digest compilers have overlooked or placed
under an inappropriate head. But, long or short as these opinions may be, a careful observer will note that by the elaboration
of their reasoning they have to a great extent lost their quality
of precedents, and become not much else than statements of doctrine. Facts are only recited so far as is necessary to illustrate
the doctrine, and frequently they are not stated at all, beyond
some general reference which shows that the law questions treated
were really involved.
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Indeed, it is nearly impossible to create such precedents as made
up the old collections. Both civil and criminal treatises show
that in early times there -must have been either special verdicts,
or some equivalent determination of the facbs assumed and relied
on, in nearly all of the decided and reported cases. The English
judges had a good deal of jealousy of the prerogatives of juries,
and often managed to cheat them out of their right to apply'law
to facts through a general verdict. Until bills of exceptions were
invented, there was no other method of invoking the judgment
of an appellate court on the law questions prescribed on the trial,
except by special findings. But with us there are few special
verdicts, and courts can seldom venture to declare precisely what
facts the jury may have found. It is only on the hypothetical
propositions on which charges are given and refused, that the law
is now laid down in most instances.
It is evident that we have changed our ways, and that our
jurisprudence is but sparingly furnished with wise saws or modern
instances. We deal more with the abstract, and less with the
concrete. We must accept this as a fact in all our attempts at
simplifying and condensing our legal material. This is perhaps
the experience of most countries having an intelligent bar. The
measures which were adopted in France from the time when the
customs were first ordered to be compiled, in the various provinces and municipalities governed by their own unwritten law,
until the completion of the modern codes, all looked towards dispensing with case-law. The commentators on the local customs
refer to more or less precedents, but the written collections which
constitute the oicial evidence of their provisions are wonderful
specimens of comprehensive brevity, and do not contain a word
of illustration or argument. The Code Napoleon discountenanced
entirely the making of precedents for future cases, and the
French tribunals, as it said by those who have studied their practice, have carried out this precept with some rigor. French lawbooks seem to be written on the same principle.
In the United States, while we have in a general way professed
to be governed almost slavishly by adherence to precedent, it is
the sort of precedent before referred to, as containing doctrine
in the shape of legal rules, and not doctrine inferred from given
facts. The old American bar got into the habit of arguing, cases
on principle more from necessity than design ; but it was a fortu-
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nate necessity which enlarged their views and trained their intellects into independence and breadth. It has often been remarked,
and is true, that the early lawyers did more to give vigor and
manliness to the law-than their successors, who have fallen into
a good "inheritance. No one can justly say the former days were
better than these, in possessing greater minds or more legal learning.' We have lawyers who would have been illdstrious in any
age or country. But it is just as true now as it was then, that
wisdom is not found in a multitude of books, but in good books
thoroughly mastered. And it is equally true, that reading without meditation is not much better than eating without digestion.
Over-reading with too little reflection is one of the dangerous
besetting sins of our time;
It is not presumptuous to say that the American colonists were
not inferior to their British kinsmen in any particular except
scholastic learning, and in this they had some eminent and a
sufficient number of respectable representatives. But there were
not many considerable law libraries. The ordinary supply of an
office, outside of the opulent towns, could not have gone much
further than the few standard text-books and digests of that
period, and possibly some modern English reports. For many
years after the Revolution, and down to the present century, we
were without American reports, beyond, at most, some half a
dozen volumes of none but local use. Coke, and Hale, and
Bacon, and Comyn, and Viner made up the heavy books of the
library. Blackstone was the daily manual, and represented the
common law of both England and the United'States, as then existing, with substantial accuracy. Hardwicke apd Thurlow and
Eldon were counted the greatest recent and existing lights, and
the embodiment of equity in its improved shape. The political
struggles of the colonies, and the institutions which were passing
through experiment to permanency, had made every one fa'miliar
with the foundation principles of law and. government. They
had been compelled to look deeper than surface appearances, into
the vital organs of human society. The American lawyer was as
familiar with the old charters and liberties as with property law
and contracts, and found more pleasure and profit in studying the
text-writers who dealt with original principles than he might
have done if his dearest interests were not directly involved in
them. Both Coke and Hale were men of robust political virtuej
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and had with different tempers but equal honesty passed honorably through experiences which had daunted the virtue of eminent contemporaries of each. To those who read their works
with the same loyalty to jiistice, it is easy to see that every part
of the law was in their sight a branch from the same tree, rooted
in a deeper soil than the accumulated rubbish of cases. Great
lawyers have said that Coke's Commentary on Littleton contains
the whole common law. Some of them have said that he was
the author of no small part of the law he propounded, because
he laid it dlown dogmatically, and gave no authorities for it. But
no one could successfully foist a new set of laws upon such
jealous defenders of their old customs as the English were, and
there is no reason to suppose that Coke declared any thing to be
law that was not, in his opinion, the actual law of England ; and,
while not infallible, he was the best authority of his time, and
did much to preserve the liberties of England, public and private.
We have many admirable law treatises of recent production, but,
with all their care and fulness, it sometimes happens that those
great writers may still help us out of difficulties that our own
contemporaries have failed to consider. Our predecessors who
used those noble works had -spacious armories and good weapons.
Blackstone, too, in all but his unquestioning and highly respectable devotion to the political institutions of his day, was a true
lawyer, and a man of liberal notions much in advance of his time,
and of most of his associates. He suggested, if he did not originate, humane reforms. He made the law attractive, by showing
its harmony and its bearing on all classes and conditions. The
paucity of books, and the necessity of adapting the principles of
the common law to a new state of things, compelled the. American bar to think and reason out all important doctrines, and apply
them according to their real significance. Courts and lawyers were
often obliged to dispose of heavy controversies where there were
no libraries at all. Yet we know that their work was wisely and
thoroughly done, and that the early legal systems of our States
and Territories were often more sensible and orderly than more
modern ones. It took a considerable time to get rid of some
harsh criminal rules, and of Imprisonment for debt. But our
laud laws were simplified, our penal code became humane, and
our remedial systems were relieved of many burdens and complications. While we have in late years made further progress, the
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improvement made in sagacious law reform during our first half.
century was not only in advance of English legislation and improvement, but was much greater than has been made since. It
:was largely due to the compulsion put on the bar of working out
the law from its elements, and proving it as they proceeded, by
experience and not by the furtherance of learned writers. While
it would be unwise to discard any means of instruction, it is certainly true that facilities which relieve us from the necessity of
thinking for ourselves are of doubtful advantage.
There is one source of knowledge concerning our early improvements in the law which has been strangely overlooked, probably because not now readily accessible. Much of our
acknowledging and recording system of conveyancing, and many
of our business and civic regulations, came from the local customs
of cities and corporate towns, which had much better methods of
conveyancing than prevailed in other parts of the realm, and,
made much better regulations of trade and commerce than the
general laws provided. The influence of these local usages must
have been very great. Many of our most solid colonists came
from towns, and not from the country, and, without any statutory order to that effect or even any written or formal recognition, their old usages became patterns of the new. It was this
that led to many local differences in the common law of different
colonies and States, and to more or less statutory differences.
Upon this subject our text-books are either silent or misleading.
They usually, and it may be said in most things universally,
overlook the influence of these customs on .our jurisprudence,
and construe every thing by the general customs and laws of
England, as if they regarded the variations as accidental deviations or unreasoned innovations, instead of usages- often more
ancient than the common law, and sanctioned by time and settled
by long enjoyment. Every reader of history knows that the
municipalities of England were its most enlightened and spirited
places, and that they were always foremost in resisting encroachments, by prerogative or otherwise, on their rights. It needs no
reasoning to inform us that this advancement in political standing could never have 'been made vAthout something in local laws
and usages favorable to its growth and maintenance. It would
be difficult to reckon how much we owe the old English municipalities, and we ought to make it appear in our legal literature.
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In considering how we may best secure a more intelligible and
orderly body of law, a first necessity is a reliable knowledge of
the history of our law. We are tolerably supplied with good
general histories of our political and military experiences. But
the lack of legal history is painfully felt whenever questions are
raised concerning rights and proceedings having no place in American precedents. There' are some good histories of English law,
although they are sometimes deficient in that accuracy of statement which is required for judicial purposes. Modern research
has brought to light many valuable documents which explain or
illustrate legal questions. They have been used freely, and rated
quite highly enough. But a patient lawyer who should diligently
collate and compare what is said on various subjects by the leading law-writers of early times could not fail to discover a body
of legal philosophy not understood by all legal historians, yet
probably very significant to us. Between Hale's and Blackstone's
days a great deal of manly philosophy, and some cardinal principles of freedom, became obscured. During that period arose
the doctrine of parliamentary omnipotence, which was first
asserted as an offset to royal prerogative, but became, so far as
we were concerned, a much worse usurpation, and provoked and
produced the American Revolution. While civil liberty was
gaining ground in England, one would never infer it from a
comparison of the law ;writings of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries with those of the latter part of the seventeenth and
the eighteenth.' During this latter period, while there were
several able and independent judges, the writers of law-books
did very little to increase our respect for jurisprudence. Their
works are tame and formal compared with the outspoken and
nervous treatises of the old statesmen, who looked upon law as
their sovereign mistress, and not as their kitchen-maid.
But even the best of these sages leave out of view almost
entirely the local usages before referred to, which have so largely
influenced American institutions. No way has yet been opened
whereby we can conveniently become acquainted with the laws
and customs of London, York, Durham, the Counties Palatine,
the Cinque Ports, and-the old seaports and boroughs in which we
know the strength of the realm and the security of franchises
had refuge. Enough appears to make us wish for more ; but all
is fragmentary, and much is imperfect otherwise. Those volumes
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which antiquarians sometimes reproduce are not within general
reach or comprehension, and are not always chosen with a desire
to give useful information. We can generally pick a little out of
them; but we want something better than bric-4-brac. If some
good lawyer who has access to these things would perform for
these old corporate usages and regulations as good service as the
elder D'Israeli rendered in more purely historical and literary
collecting, he would deserve well of the profession. Much would
be explained in our systems which is now misunderstood, or not
bonsidered at all. And we should probably find the true reasons
for many variations in the laws and usages of our older States,
which have followed their emigrating children into the West and
South.
If such a collection could be made complete enough to cover
the whole ground, it would be both interesting and useful to
compile from it a body of usages generally prevailing in the
municipalities, and differing from the usual law of the realm.
It is very. well known that towns often copied each other's systems. But we can find very little on this subject, either in
reports or text-books. The cases disposed of in the city and
palatine courts, or other special jurisdictions, do not appear in
the collections; and our own lawyers travelling abroad probably
think as little of visiting these courts as of frequenting the
sanctuary of a back-alley justice. The newspapers occasionally
mention such public customary doings as strike their attention.
Much amusement is sometimes produced by the boundary perambulations in the old city parishes of London, where urchins were
formerly, and it may be are now, whipped at the landmarks, in
perpetuam rei memoriam.

Every year there is a solemn counting

of nails and splitting of fagots, in performance of the conditions of
some antiquated tenure. To most of us who read the accounts
of these performances, the reasons of them are unfamiliar. Few
know much, if any thing, about the Treasury usages, and the
modern use of tallies, or how it came to an end in the burning
of the Houses of Parliament. It has been shrewdly suspected
that a more thorough knowledge of the processes of the Exchequer would have prevented some anonialies not unknow~n in
our own practice, in rendering summary and ex parte judgments
against public debtors and recognitors. And there are probably
many things in the government routine which are about as little
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known as local customs, that have crept into our business and
been dealt with ignorantly. The researches of the Record Commission have brought out some things which indicate large
reserves of material that could be obtained by proper search
and diligence. When these inatters are brought to light, we
shall no doubt be able to find in them many peculiar ways and
practices which will seem familiar from their existence in a modified form among us, as we often trace a family likeness to a
remote ancestor.
So far as our recognized law is concerned, it has been a favorite
scheme of" legal philosophers to reduce it td a short and simple
code, embracing all permanent and general rules, if no more.
In our composite government this can never be done by authority.
Our success in getting it done by law in the several States whose
ievised statutes are meant to approximate it, has not been flat:
tering. The most celebrated revisions have led to much litigation, and the work of construing them has been increased by
amendment.
But there is not, and never has been, any reason why those
who have faith in the plan should not attempt it themselves. If
properly framed, it would be very desirable, and might at any
rate form the basis for a scheme of institutes. We have already
several text-books on particular branches of*the law, which have
aimed at something like it, and have done much to prepare for
it. But such a work cannot be well done at once or at a single
heat. The condensing process must be very gradual. Before a
short paragraph containing a perfect enunciation of a principle
can be framed correctly, the entire statement must be found or
prepared at sufficient length, and with care enough to include
every exception and qualification. Not until the whole ground
is covered in this way can the work of condensation begin. Then
every redundancy must be so carefully pruned off as to remove
nothing that is not superfluous. In this way, by degrees, the
complete proposition will be developed, containing every thing
essential, and nothing else. Such work cannot safely be dofie
by the unaided work of a single person. It needs the aid of
conference and suggestion, and of fresh and independent crit.
icism.
Every formula that does not convey a clear and complete
meaning to others is defective The difficulty with single writers
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is that they read their own writings in the light of their own
knowledge and theories, and forget that others who read them
do not have the same preparation, and do not look through the
author's eyes. The InStitutes of Justinian, which are perhaps as
perfect of their kind as any legal writings in existence, were not
only prepared by a joint commission, but are evidently old maxims
newly arranged. The same formulas appear repeatedly in the
Digest, and in older collections. The American codes, which
have always been prepared under joint supervision, and are very
ably drawn, are not exceptions to the rule that such formulation
cannot be done at once. With all their care in comparing and
revising, and in spite of the aid freely sought of outside criticism,
they cannot be regarded as beyond the need of considerable
amendment. The preparation of the French codes, the history
of which is very carefully recorded, was more deliberate and
cautious by far than that of the system of Justinian, and resulted
They represent the successive
in very remarkable success.
efforts of centuries, and of many minds of several generations.
Some confusion has been caused by the use of the term "! code,"
to represent what was formerly known as institutes' as well as
with its old meaning as a body of enacted, instead of commonlaw, regulations. The distinction is not very important, perhaps,.
because the State codes have all been made to embrace common
as well as former statute law. It is the common law which most
needs this process. But there is a difference both in the capacity
and in the necessity of compression, in different branches of the
law, that it is not wise to overlook.
It will be found, on comparing the earlier collections of institutes, that those branches of the law which are most important,
because pertaining to rights and estates, are most easily made intelligible in a short form, and that those which involve arbitrary
rules instead of questions of moral principle or convenience are
much more troublesome to condense. The customary land-laws
were so familiar to the people, that they needed little more explanation than questions of natural!justice. If we take the English
books, we find Fortescue, St. Germain, Littleton, Finch, and some
anonymous authors of institutes, putting the whole body of the
common law within so small a compass that it can be read in a
morning, with as fair a comprehension as if it had been considerably expanded. Justinian's Institutes, which are also very
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broad in their scope, take up very little space. Loysel summed
up the entire customary law common to the Pays Coutumier,
which embraced the northern half of France, into nine hundred
and nineteen articles, which average less than three lines to an
article, and which, when accompanied by a very full body of
comments and illustrations, - the result of the learned and enthusiastic devotiofn of several successive editors, all men of
distinction, - require less than seven hundred duodecimo pages
to contain them. The eighty-three articles, summing up the liberties of the Gallican Church, with preface and comments, occupy
fifty-five duodecimo pages. The Great Charter and the Constitution of the United States, both "institutional" documents,
are certainly any thing but prolix. The annotated edition of
the Coutume de Paris, which was the common law of Canada,
is in two small 16mo volumes, wfih can readily be carried in
a side-pocket.
These summaries are chiefly occupied with civil rights, although some of them touch on crimes. But the criminal law,
although pervaded by certain general principles, is nevertheless
a system of positive law, and the best writers on it have found
it necessary to write at some length. It has required less aid
from commentaries for the same reason, because the text itself
is its own comment. Early writers have been heavily overlaid
with annotations, but these have been chiefly made up by multiplying citations or illustrations, and not by explanations.
These short treatises, whether broken up into distinct propositions or written consecutively in an orderly manner, are not
calculated or designed to be used alone as complete bodies of the
law. But they ought to be complete summaries of it, and to
need no other help to give their readers a correct outline. It is
said that Justinian's Institutes were meant for students. All
persons who desire to know law or any other branch of knowledge find it profitable to have a preliminary view of the entire
field, so that when they go more fully into details they can have
constantly before them the general scheme, and know how each
particular part fits into its place with the rest. When we have
once learned this, the rest becomes comparatively simple. It is
therefore of prime importance that these brief treatises should
be very simple and clear, so as to present no hindrancd to. any
reasonably good mind, and assume no knowledge beyond that of
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ordinary men. After they have been carefully read, the larger
knowledge must be obtained from more extended general commentaries and from special treatises, with such outside references and
supplements as may be found convenient. But the little books
will, if written as they should be, neyer lose their value for
reference and review.
We have had some excellent contributions of this kind within
.a few years; not, perhaps, as complete and compendious as possible, but far more so tfrnn in the days of bulky books of badly
arranged material seemed probable. The English handy-books
have been followed by some excellent American first-books of
various kinds, not yet, perhaps, sufficiently tested, but at least
appearing well. Some valuable compends of existing law on
special topics, which have acquired deserved reputation on both
sides of the water for their eiact brevity, have not been found
suited for elementary teaching, because assuming too much
knowledge. It is sometimes forgotten that under the jury system all of our law has to be applied to facts by men who have no
professional training, and every one who seeks to formulate the
law should bear this in mind. It is also one of the temptations
of acute lawyers to ,deal with evidence as if cases could be estab,lished according to the strict methods of the logicians. But we all
know that when issues once opened must be disposed of at once,
with such testimony as is attainable and with no means of
exhausting the possibilities, very few cases can be determined
with logical certainty. We must go largely on presumptions
from what seems to be a reasorable preponderance of evidence,
with a full .understanding that the finding may be wrong, but
,with a fair probability that it is right. The rigid logicians do
not make allowance enough for the variable, but inevitably
present, element of human nature, and they do not furnish the
best rules for use in legal controversies, however valuable they
may be as suggestions for improvement. It is unsafe to have any
part of the law too subtle for popular comprehension. And laws
:which do not satisfy the popular sense cannot be carried out.
The French codes already referred to are said by the learned
jurists of France to represent the popular usages very thoroughly.
The reduction of the customs into shapewas by calling assemblies of.delegates from all parts of each province, and acting on
-their agreed testimony upon each provision. Many rules appear
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in very antique language, and had evidently been handed down
in the same words by tradition. From a comparison of these
customs, learned jurists, acting on their own behalf and not for
the government, deduced a system of rules which they found in
all the customs, and which may be said to have been the common
law of France. The Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV. is, no doubt,
little more than the collation of the existing marine usages and
regulations. It resembles very closely the other sea-laws. Before the Code Napoleon was passed, successive lawyers of the
first merit had 'spent much labor in perfecting the statement of
legal doctrines, and the French are noted for their skill in such
work. The commission had few crude materials to deal with.
And yet every sentence was discussed with the same thoroughness that made the translation of the English Bible so perfect in
the accuracy and beauty of its language. When any American
lawyer desires to set forth perfect legal formulas, he will find it
necessary to use similar means, and no one need be troubled if
perfection does not come in his day. We can find profit in less
than perfection, if it ismodest in its claims.
Our ordinary text-books are so well prepared that we need
very little more than a good collection of institutes to present a
complete system, and serve as a general introduction and analysis. Our books are often written by profound jurists, and most
of them from the beginning have made principles prominent, and
not merely dwelt on authorities. The English text-books since
Lord Hale's day have very generally been no more than convenient digests. Jones on Bailments and Abbott on Shipping
were out of the common order. The present generation of
'English lawyers take much more philosophic views than some of
their predecessors,, and deal with important questions liberally
and sensibly. But while there never was a time when there
were not great English lawyers, the last century did not bring
to the surface any considerable ability in public'law, and such
men as Mansfield and Thurlow and the Yorkes will be remembered as exceptional. Eminence in legal acuteness alone is not
likely to interest posterity.
During all of our early history we were constantly engaged in
a struggle to maintain the most important principles of constitutional and international law, and our books are a natural result
of that training. The names of Kent and Story always come to
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the front in all mention of legal bibliography. Judge Story
injured his later editions by diffuseness, but his books are, nevertheless, written on a true theory, and philosophically. Chancellor Kent's simple and orderly commentaries are as conspicuous
for wisdom and sagacity as for sound learning, and made the law
so plain to the common understanding that it is at once recognized as justice. We have a fair share of good treatises written
by men of eminence and long experience. We find them rapidly
taking the place of older books, and relieving lawyers from a good
deal of case-reAding. They are rapidly tending, however, to
special treatment of narrow subjects, which is very convenient
to the practitioner, but which is apt to lead the writers into
treating them as hobbies, and exaggerating their importance.
It is also likely to lead to dwelling on fine distinctions, which in
business matters makes bad law. Where a distinction is too
attenuated for ordinary notice, it is wise to conclude, in the language of the old adage, de non apparentibus et de non existentibus
eadem est ratio.
When our law has been so modified by the new industries and
interests so rapidly springing up on every side, as to need
another Kent to bring it into system, he will find his material
already very well classified; and so much of the law as is common
to all of the States can undoubtedly be brought into so good a
shape that the citer of many cases will be looked upon as one of
the curiosities of the bar.
JAMES V. CAMPBELL.
DETROIT, MICH.
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